York College YCMUN 4/5/2014
YORK
COLLEGE OF PENNSYLVANIA
MODEL
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE: DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
COMMITTEE
United
Nations
Disarmament
and International Security Committee (First Committee)
Background
The
Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC), also called
the
"First Committee", addresses agenda items relating to issues of
weapon disarmament, challenges and threats to international peace,
weapons of
mass destruction, and international security matters. In 1952, the
General
Assembly, by its resolution 502 (VI) of January 1952, created the
United
Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) under the Security Council with a
general
mandate on disarmament questions. In 1998, by its decision 54/492, the
General
Assembly decided that the UNDC's agenda, as of 2000, would normally
comprise
two substantive items per year from the whole range of disarmament
issues,
including one on nuclear disarmament.
DISEC
considers all disarmament and international security matters within the
scope
of the United Nations Charter and related powers, the general
principles of
cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, and
measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of
armaments. The
First Committee makes recommendations on the regulation of these
weapons as
they relate to international peace and security. The First Committee
does not
address legal issues surrounding weapon possession or control complex
peace and
security issues addressed by the Security Council. DISEC works in close
cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the
Geneva-based
Conference on Disarmament.
The
delegates to the Disarmament and International Security Council of
MUNTR 2014,
will be required to lead their debates with the ultimate aim of
contributing to
the maintenance of international peace and security through addressing
two
specific and rather innovate approaches to disarmament and the related
international security matters; (1) Security of Nuclear Waste
Materials, and
(2) Preventing Weaponization of Outer Space.
(1) Security of Nuclear
Waste Materials
Convention
on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) & Other Treaties
The
care
and control of nuclear materials is governed through several
international and
regional treaties and agreements. The first international treaty to
regulate
nuclear proliferation Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) for establishment of
a
Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) in Latin America. One year later, the
Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) became the first
non-regional
international nuclear proliferation treaty. The Treaty of Bangkok
(1995)
established the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which strictly
limits and
controls the testing of nuclear weapons. The Treaty of Pelindaba
(1994), which
established an African NWFZ, was the first treaty to include specific
provisions for methods of dismantling nuclear weapons and facilities,
specific
regulations and guidelines for handling nuclear waste, and provided
African
nations with the legal right to refuse to allow nuclear material to be
dumped
on or transportation through their lands. The Basel Convention (1989)
sought to
control transporting hazardous materials over international borders.
Several
other regional treaties, agreements, conventions, and commissions have
developed over time for the purpose of limiting nuclear proliferation.
Primary
among these is the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material
(CPPNM). Signed at Vienna and at New York on 3 March 1980, the
Convention is
the only international legally binding undertaking in the area of
physical
protection of nuclear material. It establishes measures related to the
prevention,
detection and punishment of offenses relating to nuclear material. A
Diplomatic
Conference in July 2005 was convened with the purpose of strengthening
the
CPPNM provisions to makes it legally binding for States Parties to
protect
nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage, and
transport and to expand cooperation between and among States regarding
rapid
measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material,
mitigate
any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat
related
offenses. The issue of amending the CPPNM has stalled since 2005; the
amendments will take effect once they have been ratified by two-thirds
of the
States Parties of the Convention.
Treaty
on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Secondary
governance is with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons
(NPT), a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent
the spread
of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in
the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving
nuclear
disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Opened for signature
in 1968,
the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was
extended
indefinitely. Its membership includes 190 States Parties, including the
five
nuclear-weapon States, making it the largest of any arms control treaty
in the
world. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a
multilateral
treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States.
The
Treaty is underpinned by three “pillars”—nuclear nonproliferation,
disarmament,
and the peaceful use of nuclear energy—and is regarded as the legal and
political cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The NPT
is often
seen to be based on a central bargain that non-nuclear-weapon states
agree
never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in
exchange
agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to
pursue
nuclear disarmament aimed to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. The
Treaty
establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the
International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance
with the
Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes
cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal
access to
this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the
diversion
of fissile material for weapons use.
The
International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA)
The
International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an international organization that seeks
to
promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to inhibit its use for
any
military purpose, including nuclear weapons. The IAEA was established
as an
autonomous organization on 29 July 1957.
Though established independently from the United Nations, the
IAEA
reports to both the United Nations General Assembly and the Security
Council, using
its authority to encourage the development of the peaceful applications
of
nuclear technology, to provide international safeguards against misuse
of
nuclear technology and nuclear materials, and to promote nuclear safety
(including radiation protection) and nuclear security standards, as
well as
their implementation. The IAEA are the first response to any event
involving
use, abuse, or release of nuclear materials and are the agency
responsible for
responding to nuclear disasters such as Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima
(2011).
The IAEA came under criticism after the 2011 Fukushima accident, with
independent nuclear experts claiming that the nuclear industry lacks
sufficient
oversight, particularly after allegations of improper disposal of
nuclear waste
at Fukushima which was "overlooked" by IAEA inspectors. The problems
at Fukushima have brought to public light the problems with regulation
of
disposal of nuclear materials.
Nuclear
Waste Materials
Laws
regarding the regulation of material fall under the control of the
Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) which notes that
"the difference between storage and disposal is that the first implies
an
intention to retrieve the radioactive waste and the second implies an
intention
not to retrieve it. The licensed owner of the waste has, by law, an
obligation
to dispose of it; this applies to low level waste (e.g. from hospitals)
as well
as to waste from power reactors. The law cannot specify the maximum
duration of
storage, but it should ensure that an extended storage does not become
de facto
disposal." Members of the international scientific community have
renewed
calls to redefine the mandate of the IAEA so that it can better police
nuclear
power plants worldwide and ensure that long-term "storage" does not
become "disposal" in violation of CPPNM. At present the IAEA
recommends safety standards, but member states are not required to
comply; it
promotes nuclear energy, but it also monitors nuclear use; it is the
sole
global organization overseeing the nuclear energy industry, yet it is
also
weighed down by checking compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty
(NPT) as well as enforcing the laws established under the CPPNM.
One
heavily used method of nuclear waste disposal is to drill depositories
deep
underground and place storage containers off nuclear waste within the
earth;
however, there is a risk of containers leaking and poisoning the area.
Materials could be stored above ground in specially designed and
monitored
storage containers; this method is not presently in significant use.
Some
groups have expressed concern with security of above and below ground
storage
facilities, fearing these could be the targets of terrorism attacks or
theft of
hazardous material. There has been some argument on the utility of
disposing of
nuclear waste in the deep ocean by burying the material beneath a
stable
abyssal plain, in a subduction zone (that would slowly carry the waste
downward
into the Earth's mantle), or burial beneath a remote natural or
human-made
island. Studies have indicated that marine burial may be a viable
solution to
the nuclear waste problem; however, this would be a violation of the
Law of the
Sea Convention which defines the rights and responsibilities of nations
in
their use of the world's oceans, establishing guidelines for
businesses, the
environment, and the management of marine natural resources.
Other
methods of disposal have been considered, with some moving on to
research and
others being dismissed. The proposed
"mix and reuse" methods have been met with generally negative
responses from the scientific community as impractical, and/or
dangerous.
Equally quickly dismissed was the idea of ejection of material into
space,
which was ruled extremely dangerous due to the risk of reentry of
ejected
nuclear waste materials back into Earth's atmosphere. The most
popular
alternative to land disposal and storage is subductive waste disposal
method
which insert nuclear waste in a subduction zone accessed from land, and
therefore is not prohibited by international agreement. There have been
proposals for reactors that consume nuclear waste and transmute it to
other,
less-harmful nuclear waste. This has resulted in a practical nuclear
research
reactor called Myrrha in which transmutation is possible. Additionally,
a new
research program called ACTINET has been started in the EU to make
transmutation possible on a large, industrial scale. At present this
method is
extremely expensive and impractical; research has not progressed into
an
effective and reliable reactor disposal method as of this date.
Improper
Disposal of
Nuclear Waste
Security
of disposal and storage facilities and proper disposal of nuclear
materials is
of primary concern. Scavenging of abandoned radioactive material has
been the
cause of several other cases of radiation exposure, mostly in
developing
nations, where an irresponsible radioactive material owner fails to
properly
dispose of dangerous materials. The scavengers and those who buy the
material,
usually radioactive metal, are almost always unaware that the material
is
radioactive and it is selected for its aesthetics or scrap value. For
an
example of an accident involving radioactive scrap originating from a
hospital
see the Goiânia accident. After the Fukushima disaster, the
Japanese government
admitted that nuclear substances were found in the waste of the
facility. Japan
did start discussions with the IAEA about the large quantities of
enriched
uranium and plutonium that were discovered in nuclear waste cleared
away by
Japanese nuclear operators. There is no present information on whether
or not
Japan was sanctioned for illegal and improper disposal of nuclear
materials.
Several
incidents have occurred when radioactive material was disposed of
improperly,
shielding during transport was defective, or when it was simply
abandoned or
even stolen from a waste store. In the Soviet Union, waste stored in
Lake
Karachay was blown over the area during a dust storm after the lake had
partly
dried out. At Maxey Flat, Kentucky, a low-level radioactive waste
facility,
containment trenches covered with dirt, instead of steel or cement,
collapsed
under heavy rainfall and filled with water which became radioactive and
had to
be disposed of at the Maxey Flat facility. Authorities in Italy claim
that
nuclear waste disposal company Enea paid the 'Ndrangheta mafia clan to
get rid
of 600 drums of toxic and radioactive waste from Italy, Switzerland,
France,
Germany, and the US in Somalia by buying off local politicians and
burying the
waste in shallow disposal pockets in the 1980s and 1990s and blowing up
shiploads of waste, including radioactive hospital waste, and sending
them to
the sea bed off the Calabrian coast. According
to the environmental group Legambiente, former members of the
'Ndrangheta have
said that they were paid to sink ships with radioactive material for
the last
20 years. In other cases of radioactive waste accidents, lakes or ponds
with
radioactive waste accidentally overflowed into the rivers during
exceptional
storms.
Questions
to Consider:
Should
the mandate of the
IAEA be changed to give the agency more enforcement power?
Should
the IAEA be split
into two branches, one for enforcement of NPT and one for enforcement
of CPPNM?
What
solutions would your
country recommend for the problem of nuclear waste security, storage,
and
disposal?
Sources:
www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1160_web.pdf
(2)
Preventing Weaponization of Outer Space
Treaties
and Legal Declarations
There
are
several treaties and legal declarations which establish the
international
standard rules and regulations pertaining to use of outer space.
Treaties and declarations pertain to rules and
standards for
cooperation and proper use of outer space generally relating to safety
in day
to day usage. The Rescue Agreement (1968) governs rules of cooperation
in the
rescue and recovery of astronauts and objects launched into space. The
Liability Convention (1972) states rules of responsibility in the event
that an
object launched into space by a State reenters Earth and causes
damage to
property of another State. The Registration Convention (1975) sets
rules and
requirements for proper identification of objects which are launched
into outer
space by a state. There are several treaties and conventions
establishing the
rules for launching and maintaining telecommunications and broadcasting
satellites and the purposes for which they can be used. These treaties
and
declarations provide a historical background of international
cooperation and
agreement regarding use of outer space.
The
primary purpose of these treaties and declarations is to set rules,
guidelines,
and limitations on any State’s ability to use or declare ownership of
portions
of the moon or outer space and governs how outer space can be used,
including
restrictions on remote spying and weaponization of outer space. General
Assembly Resolution XVIII (1962) established the first Declaration of
rules for
outer space use and exploration, declaring that any such activities
“shall be
carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all mankind.”
The
Nuclear Testing Ban (1963) bans the testing of nuclear weapons in the
atmosphere, outer space, and under water. The Outer Space Treaty (1967)
set the
first specific rules on how outer space should be used and explored and
the
Moon Agreement (1979) set rules for how States can use Earth’s moon and
restricts the “claiming” of portions of the moon or planets for
settlement or
development by a State. General Assembly Resolution 41/65 (1986)
establishes
rules for “remote sensing” of Earth from outer space and sets
requirements for
information sharing. General Assembly Resolution 47/68 (1992) governs
the
establishment of nuclear power sources in outer space. General
Assembly
Resolution 51/122 (1996) declares guidelines for cooperation in
exploration of
outer space, specifically declaring the importance that exploration is
done for
the benefit of all States. The primary concerns for the
weaponization of
space center around these treaties and resolutions.
The
question facing the Committee is how to prevent weaponization of space.
At
stated in General Assembly Resolution 55/32, “prevention of an arms
race in
outer space would avert grave danger for international peace and
security.” A
report issued in June 2003 by the Committee of the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space
(A/58/20) noted “Some delegations expressed the view that a greater
risk of the
introduction of weapons into outer space and the adoption of a concept
of a use
of force in outer space would undermine the basis for and the very
logic of
developing nonproliferation mechanisms and of the whole system of
international
security.” October 2006 saw a near-unanimous vote at the General
Assembly
when 166 nations voted for a resolution to prevent an arms race in
outer space,
with Isreal abstaining from vote and the United States voting against
the
resolution.
At
present, the primary opponent of resolutions prohibiting
militarization
of outer space is the United States, who has declared the right of
weaponization in space in order to protect their national interests and
security (NY Times 2005). In response China and Russia have voiced
concern over
the necessity to develop space technology in order to protect their own
interests, now collaborating to protect their joint national interests
(BBC,
2007; Deccan Herald, 2014). The most recent reports indicate that
Russia will
be testing a new “military spacecraft” in March of 2014 (Russia &
India
Report, 2014). These activities and declarations by the United States,
China,
and Russia are in violation of General Assembly Resolution XVIII
(1962),
the Outer Space Treaty (1967), and General Assembly Resolution 51/122
(1996).
Some military analysts argue that, despite international laws and
treaties, the
weaponization of space is inevitable.
Questions
to Consider:
What
authority, if any,
does the UN and the First Committee have to prevent the weaponization
of space?
Should
sanctions be imposed
against the States that are presently accused of violating
international treaty
and law with regard to non-weaponization?
Should
the UN establish a
policing authority with the power to monitor space technology
development; and
if so, what power should be granted to such an authority?
Sources:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6278867.stm
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/18/business/18space.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/142355/russia-reiterates-danger-outer-space.html
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treatystatus/index.html
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